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Abstract
In the article titled Rehabilitation: A Proposal for a Climate Compensation Mechanism for Small Island States, Professor Maxine Burkett exhaustively unpacks some
of the most fundamental climate-induced slow-onset events and concerns facing the
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). Burkett proposes a compensation and rehabilitation mechanism to address damage and loss to small island states due to
slow-onset events. Using Caribbean AOSIS states as primary examples, Burkett’s
insightful paper provides a thorough and sustained argument on the rationale for a
compensation and rehabilitation mechanism as well as a framework for implementing such mechanism at the international level.
This response paper examines the potential and paradoxes of the compensation and
rehabilitation proposal, with a focus on some practical questions that a Compensation and Rehabilitation Commission (CRC) may face along the way. It starts by
providing further statistics on the dual vulnerabilities of AOSIS states in Africa
that lend credence to Burkett’s arguments that the vulnerabilities of many AOSIS
states call for global responses that go beyond disaster risk reduction and management and risk transfer, to focus more on providing a robust package of compensation and rehabilitation through a CRC. It then discusses four key practical questions that must be further examined to fine-tune the CRC proposal. They are
epistemic questions, floodgate question, institutional proliferation, and accountability questions.

I. Introduction
With emerging signs of temperature change all over the world, it is now
widely accepted that climate change is real—that human emissions of
greenhouse gases are a cause; that if left unchecked, climate change may lead to
extreme weather events such as droughts and flooding; that it may threaten
food security; and that it may lead to ill health and economic decline in nations
of the world.1 Climate change, however, poses even more serious economic,
social, and environmental threats to small island states—arguably, more so
than any other group in the world. Apart from the unique geographical
vulnerabilities of small island states which contribute to their low adaptive

1.
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James Hansen, Defusing the Global Warming Time Bomb, 3 SCI. AM. 68, 68-77 (2004). See also
Margot Wallstro m, Meeting the Long Term Challenge of Global Warming: A European
Perspective, in CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: MEETING THE LONG-TERM CHALLENGE OF
GLOBAL WARMING 17, 17-25 (David Michel ed., Ctr. for Transatlantic Rel. 2003); Geoffrey Lean,
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capacity, AOSIS includes African Islands such as Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau,
and Mauritius, countries that have dual vulnerability to climate change—both
as arid countries in the Sahel region and as impoverished small island states.2
For example, even without climate change, Sahelian islands are currently
subjected to tough arid conditions, which typically make farming and
agriculture difficult and near impossible.3 A region is classified as arid if it is
characterized by a severe lack of available water, to the extent of hindering or
preventing the growth and development of plant and animal life.4 Such climate
change would only escalate these pre-existing conditions, thereby intensifying
the cycle of food shortage, water scarcity, and the spread of diseases in Sahelian
African States.5
Secondly, the underwhelming economic and social conditions typical of many
AOSIS states are even more severe in Africa, where some of the world’s poorest
people live; arguably, more severe than the Caribbean countries which Professor
Burkett discussed. Cape Verde, for example, reveals statistics and figures that
are even more alarming than those adduced by Burkett, and which further
reinforce the importance of a compensation and rehabilitation process for the
highly vulnerable residents of small island states. Cape Verde is a tiny island
350 miles off the coast of Senegal in West Africa with a population of 491,875—
essentially, tiny when compared to the State of California alone (which has 38
million people) or when compared to the United State of America’s 313 million
people. Eighty percent of Cape Verde’s population lives in the coastal zone.6
2.

3.
4.

5.
6.

The name “Sahel” is derived from the Arabic word sahil, which means “border of the desert.”
The Sahel region covers nine countries: Mauritania, Senegal, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau,
Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Cape Verde. It has a total area of 5.4 million km2 and a
population of almost 60 million. See Keffing Sissoko et al., Agriculture, Livelihoods & Climate
Change in the West African Sahel, 11 REGIONAL ENVT’L CHANGE S119, S119-25 (Supp. 2010);
Adrian Chappell & Clive T. Agnew, Modelling Climate Change in West African Sahel Rainfall
(1931–90) as an Artifact of Changing Station Locations, 24 INT’L J. CLIMATOLOGY 547, 547-54
(2004).
A. Ben Mohamed, N. van Duivenbooden & S. Abdoussallam, Impact of Climate Change on
Agricultural Production in the Sahel—Part 1. Methodological Approach and Case Study for
Millet in Niger, 54 CLIMATIC CHANGE 327, 327-48 (2002).
Water is a scarce resource in all Sahel countries. Besides erratic rainfall patterns, poor soils
and unfavourable socioeconomic conditions are key constraints to agricultural development in
Sahelian states. See H. P. Bailey, Semi-Arid Climates: Their Definition and Distribution, in
AGRICULTURE IN SEMIARID ENVIRONMENTS 73, 73-97 (Anthony E. Hall, Glenn H. Cannel &
Harry W. Lawton eds., 1979); A.J. Dietz, R. Ruben & Jan Verhagen, The Impact of Climate
Change on Drylands With a Focus on West Africa, 39 ENV’T & POL’Y 465 (2001), available at
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/40143328_Impact_of_climate_change_on_drylands_w
ith_a_focus_on_West_Africa.
Chris Huntingford et al., Aspects of Climate Change Prediction Relevant to Crop Productivity,
360 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y BIO. SCI. 1999, 2000-01 (2005).
The World Factbook: Cabo Verde, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cv.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2014); GOV’T OF CAPE VERDE,

135

13 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (2015)

Many houses are constructed with non-resistant wood materials that are
vulnerable to coastal hazards and sea-level rise, while about 75% of food must
be imported. Cape Verde annually runs a high trade deficit, financed by foreign
aid and remittances from emigrants, where remittances constitute a supplement
to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of more than 20%. At present, nearly half
of the population lacks access to a public water supply and over half lacks access
in rural areas. With a 30% unemployment rate (compared to the United States’
6%) and a GDP per capita of $3,900 (compared to the United States’ $52,000),
Cape Verde is currently in dire economic conditions.
The service sector has been the main engine of growth in Cape Verde,
accounting for over 70% of GDP, with over 21% of GDP (and over 80% of foreign
direct investment) from tourism alone.7 Tourist facilities are concentrated in
the coastal zone of low-lying islands, such as Sal and Boavista, and are
vulnerable to sea-level rise and coastal hazards. Beaches—on which the
industry depends—are threatened by sea-level rise and sand extraction.
Increased climatic pressure and flooding from climate change may affect tourist
facilities in Cape Verde’s coastal zones, consequently shutting down Cape
Verde’s principal source of revenue.
Due to both vulnerabilities, Cape Verde has been ranked the eighth most
endangered nation on earth as a result of flooding from climate change.8 An
additional strain on Cape Verde—due to climate change—may literarily shut
down the entire country. With more scientific and technical expositions of the
unique vulnerabilities of climate change in countries such as Cape Verde, there
seems to be an emerging consensus that the negative effects of slow-onset events
are already affecting AOSIS states, and there is a need for appropriate,
sustainable financial instruments for addressing loss and damage associated
with slow-onset events. Despite this growing awareness and consensus, the
question of ‘how’ has yet to attain the desired level of scholarly agreement and
articulation. That is, what is the appropriate legal and policy framework
through which sustainable financial instruments appropriate for addressing loss
and damage associated with slow-onset events may be provided for AOSIS
states?

7.
8.
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CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF CAPE VERDE–SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 9,
11 (2012), available at http://www.unep.org/dewa/Portals/67/pdf/SPM-CAPE-VERDE.pdf.
GOV’T OF CAPE VERDE, supra note 6, at 11.
See Sven HARMELING & DAVID ECKSTEIN, GERMANWATCH, GLOBAL CLIMATE RISK INDEX 2013,
19, 24 (2013), available at http://germanwatch.org/fr/download/7170.pdf; BRIGIDA ROCHA
BRITO ET AL., TURISMO EM MEIO INSULAR AFRICANO: POTENCIALIDADES, CONSTRANGIMENTOS E
IMPACTOS (2010).
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Many of the previous policy prescriptions focus only on one aspect of AOSIS'
original proposal to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC)—an insurance mechanism, through which they can access
funds immediately after a disaster.9 Furthermore, while AOSIS’s proposal also
contained the two-pronged aspects of disaster risk management and
compensation and rehabilitation, the disaster risk management aspect has
received more favorable articulation than the compensation and rehabilitation
component.
Burkett rightly adduces this to the prevailing attitude of
pessimism, lack of political will, and explicit rejection of any measure that might
vaguely resemble climate-related reparations. Through her paper, Burkett has
made one of the strongest arguments for the need for attitudinal change and
reconsideration.
The current reality in small island states such as Cape Verde lends credence
to Burkett’s views that there is a need to establish a compensation and
rehabilitation commission (CRC) under the UNFCCC, through which small
island states can be adequately compensated and rehabilitated for slow-onset
events. The key aim of the CRC would be to disburse monies from a global pool
to rehabilitate individuals, communities, and countries affected by slow-onset
events, such as sea level rise, increasing temperatures, ocean acidification,
glacial retreat and related impacts, salinization, land and forest degradation,
and loss of biodiversity and desertification.10 Burkett’s proposal on how the
compensation and rehabilitation mechanism may be structured is undoubtedly
thorough and convincing.
However, considering the level of scrutiny and review such a proposal would
have to go through at the international level, certain questions arise from
Burkett's proposal that call for more thoughts. To provoke attitudinal change in
this area, practical questions that may stifle the workability of the CRC must be
anticipated and thoroughly addressed to ensure that the proposal is not stripped
of its radical promise. Adopting McGovern’s framework on the eight initial
variables that must be considered in designing a claims resolution process, the
four key issues discussed here fall under organization and implementation,
damage methodology, and compensation.11

9.
10.
11.

Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Proposal to the AWG-LCA: Multi-Window
Mechanism to Address Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts (2008), available at
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/aosisinsurance061208.pdf.
U. N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Cancun, Mex., Nov. 29-Dec.10, 2010, Report of
the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1
(Mar. 15, 2011).
See Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1361 (2005).
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II. Strengthening the CRC: Some Thoughts
Despite the promise of the CRC as a holistic framework for addressing loss
and damage by rehabilitating individuals, communities, and countries affected
by slow-onset events, there are a number of concerns on the practicality of
implementing the CRC framework. They include epistemic questions, floodgate
question, institutional proliferation, and accountability questions.
A. Epistemic Questions
Epistemic concerns include questions on whether climate change
administrators within the UNFCCC system have the requisite capacity to
implement such a compensatory mechanism. An epistemic community has been
defined as a network of professionals with recognized expertise in a particular
domain and an authoritative claim to knowledge within that domain. They
have a shared set of normative and causal beliefs, shared notions of validity,
and a common policy enterprise.12
The United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) defines capacity as the ability of individuals, institutions,
and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve
objectives in a sustainable manner.13 Adopting this definition, the question is
whether the UNFCCC has the capacity and resources to support the quasijudicial functions, particularly the technical fact-finding aspect of the work, of a
CRC. There have been increased arguments that the interpretation and
application of international obligations should be concentrated in bodies whose
primary function is claim adjudication, and that it is dangerous to place the
function of interpreting claims in the hands of professional administrators.14
Determining the appropriate level of compensation and rehabilitation and
monies to disburse to a country based on its filed claims undoubtedly requires
some degree of fact finding—ascertaining the claims and providing a final
funding decision based on the appraisal of the claims—that is typical of the role
of a common law judge or arbiter in determining the quantum of compensatory
12.

13.
14.
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Jorge Daniel Taillant, Founder, Ctr. for Hum. Rts. and Env’t (CEDHA), Presentation at the
U.N. Hum. Rts. Council Seminar to Address the Adverse Impacts of Climate Change on the
Full Enjoyment of Hum. Rts., Session 3: Forging Stronger Cooperation Between Human
Rights and Climate Change Communities (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/Seminar2012/DanielTaillant24Feb2012.pdf;
Christopher
McCrudden, Mainstreaming Equality in Northern Ireland 1998-2004: A Review of Issues
Concerning the Operation of the Equality Duty in Sec. 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, in
2 SECTION 75 EQUALITY DUTY: AN OPERATIONAL REVIEW 52-76 (Eithne McLaughlin & Neil
Faris eds., 2004).
CARLOS LOPES & THOMAS THEISOHN, OWNERSHIP, LEADERSHIP & TRANSFORMATION: CAN WE
DO BETTER FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT? 1 (2003).
See generally McCrudden, supra note 12.
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damages sufficient in amount to indemnify the injured person for the loss
suffered. Ascribing a monetary amount to the climate change loss a country has
suffered—whether this loss is due to direct impacts of slow-onset events, a loss
of revenue, loss of culture and tradition, emotional loss or the loss of a financial
opportunity—can never be a straightforward exercise. Failure to get it right
may result in insufficient compensation or in a windfall, both of which will be
detrimental to the ultimate goals of the CRC.
This difficulty in getting it right is often exacerbated when, as is often the
case with climate change, the line between causation and damages is unclear.
As Vaughan Williams L.J. advised in the seminal case of Chaplin v. Hicks, “The
fact that damages cannot be assessed with certainty does not relieve the
wrongdoer of the necessity of paying damages."15 However, in such situations
the highest level of skill and experience is required to ensure that the correct
test is applied for each element of the inquiry. As noted in the English case of
Allied Maples Grp. v. Simmons & Simmons, it is necessary to establish “where
causation ends and quantification of damage begins.”16
The nature of claims associated with climate-induced losses will require a
great deal of skill and competence to establish a clear link between climate
change and damages resulting from slow-onset events. Some of the damages
adduced to slow-onset events may in fact be attributed to other causes not
covered by the UNFCCC framework.17 The question, therefore, is whether
professional administrators within the UNFCCC have the required epistemic
expertise to consider such questions that may arise with respect to causation
and damage quantification.
More importantly, where the loss is contingent on uncertain future events,
the CRC would be faced with a challenge that requires a real exercise of its
discretion and skill. Assessing damages may be further complicated if there is
uncertainty as to whether a future event that will cause loss to the claimant will
materialize at all. For example, if a small island state is claiming damages for
the possibility of losing its revenue from tourism due to climate change,—there
is only a chance of this occurring, as it is a future occurrence the certainty of
which cannot be ascertained—providing compensatory damages for such claims
would require a high-level consideration of this contingency and its likely
15.
16.
17.

Chaplain v. Hicks, [1911] A.C. 788 (Eng.).
Allied Maples Grp. Ltd. v. Simmons & Simmons, [1999] A.C. 1602 (Eng.).
For example, some of the critics of the science on slow-onset events and climate change
attribute some of the problems to natural causes. See, e.g., Bob Ellis & Syun Akasogu, Climate
Change: Science Manipulated - Natural Causes of Global Warming are Much More Significant
than
Man-Made
Changes,
CLIMATE REALISTS
(June
3,
2009,
5:46
AM),
http://climaterealists.com/index.php?id=3524.
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impacts. Traditionally, courts deal with such situations by factoring in a
contingency allowance. This contingency is incorporated into the damages
calculations by means of a percentage figure that represents the percentage
chance of the event materializing. As held by Lord Diplock in Mallett v.
McMonagle, the court must make an estimate as to the chances that the
particular thing will or would have happened and reflect those chances, and
whether they are more or less than even in the amount of damages which it
awards.18 Thus, factors such as life expectancy, likelihood of earnings and
revenue, the likelihood of a disease developing, or the possibility of future
infrastructural collapse are accounted for in percentage terms estimated by the
court. The question, however, is how effective this approach is in reality. As is
often pointed out by experts testifying before the court as to the quantification of
damages, in science and medicine an event either materializes or it does not.
Accordingly, a plaintiff may develop a terminal disease and die, or a plaintiff
may live ailment-free to a venerable age. Awarding damages on a percentage
contingency basis seems to under-compensate the plaintiff in the former
instance and unfairly reward the plaintiff for a loss it never incurred in the
latter scenario. Without the gift of prophetic foresight, the CRC would have no
way of knowing for a certainty that a future climatic event, which is the subject
of a compensatory claim will or will not materialize. Typically, a court may
address the case of uncertainty by providing a claimant with the most equitable
measure of damages it is able to derive from the facts before it. This
undoubtedly requires a level of skill and competence to be able to determine the
most equitable compensation based on the circumstances surrounding each and
every claim. This also goes to the question of whether a CRC composed of
professional administrators would have the required level of skill to determine
the equitable compensation for claims based on future events.
The CRC proposal must therefore be re-examined to determine whether
outsiders to the workings of international law adjudication have the capacity
and skills to fully implement such compensatory mechanisms. The question to
ask is whether climate change administrators possess the requisite skill,
training, competence, and experience to appraise technical claims for
compensation due to climate change impacts, some of which touch on several
international law treaties.

18.
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B. Floodgate Question
This question goes directly to the donor fatigue issue raised by Burkett.
However, it looks at the issue from a slightly different angle. Here, we ask
whether establishing a separate compensation and rehabilitation mechanism for
AOSIS states will open a floodgate of similar claims from other non-AOSIS
developing countries, particularly African states, which also have strong claims
based on the negative social, environmental, and economic impacts of climate
change in their regions. Many followers of the climate change negotiations will
agree, for example, that Africa’s climate change diplomacy is strongly
underpinned by a notion of entitlement to compensation, funding, technology
transfer, and adaptation assistance from industrialized countries that bear
historical responsibilities for the cause of climate change. For example, during
the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, African countries pushed for a "fair deal,"
which included the recognition of climate change as a problem created by
industrialized countries, and which can and should only be resolved by the same
industrialized countries, who have the capacity and resources to do so. Thus,
the crux of the African proposal centered on common but differentiated
responsibilities, technology transfer, financial assistance, special circumstance,
and poverty recognition through flexible mechanisms. This perception remains
the same today. As such, if a CRC for AOSIS states were to be approved to
disburse monies from a global pool to rehabilitate individuals, communities, and
countries affected by slow-onset events, there are real chances that African
countries and other non-AOSIS states may push for such recognition through a
separate fund or a CRC for African states. An argument may be made that the
claims of AOSIS, though unique, are not more troubling than the fears,
concerns, and realities in African countries, such as Sudan (threatened by
drought and flood) or Nigeria’s Niger Delta region, which is typically a coastal
zone increasingly facing climate-induced threats and forced migration patterns.
If an international climate change regime were to establish such additional
funds, donors to these global pools may feel overwhelmed by the number of
requests to provide funding support for climate change compensation and
rehabilitation. In other words, this could further heighten the donor fatigue
concern highlighted in current international climate change efforts. One way of
navigating this concern is to suggest that the CRC proposed by Professor
Burkett should not be limited to AOSIS states alone. This, however, raises the
question of whether there is sufficient global funding to support such a global
pool of compensation for all countries facing slow-onset events and climate
threats, and whether the CRC would have the institutional capacity to
accommodate claims from all climate change affected regions of the world.
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C. Institutional Proliferation (Too Many Institutions)
Closely intertwined with the question of how to address compensation and
rehabilitation claims from non-AOSIS states is the question of whether
establishing the CRC would result in the duplication of roles currently played by
a number of climate change institutions, and whether it would bring about
institutional proliferation, which has been identified as a chief cause of the lack
of systemic integration, coherence, and harmony in international law.19
Creating new institutions comes with high costs and administrative
requirements—for example, the expansion of current institutions or the cost of
staffing, training, and program funding. This is why the United Nations
advocates an approach that builds on existing capacities and resources as
opposed to the proliferation of new institutions.20
This raises the question of why a new stand-alone CRC should be established,
and whether, for example, the enforcement branch of the Kyoto Compliance
Mechanism is not able to perform these functions. The Compliance Committee
is made up of two branches: a facilitative branch and an enforcement branch.21
The facilitative branch provides advice and assistance to parties to promote
their compliance and implementation of the Protocol. The enforcement branch
is responsible for determining the consequences for parties not meeting their
commitments.22
The enforcement branch is responsible for determining
whether a party included in Annex I (an “Annex I Party”) is not in compliance
with its emissions targets, the methodological and reporting requirements for
19.

20.

21.
22.
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For the debate on fragmentation of international law regimes and institutions, see Joel P.
Trachtman, Fragmentation, Coherence and Synergy in International Law, 2 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL
THEORY 505, 505-36 (2011). As Outi Korhonen puts it, it is a question on “how a synthetic order,
which is both common enough to produce cohesion and pluralistic enough not to reduce the
various cultural differences, can be achieved without succumbing to either hegemony or
unmanageable fragmentation.” OUTI KORHONEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATED: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE LAWYER'S STANCE TOWARDS CULTURE, HISTORY AND COMMUNITY 42 (2000). See also Dirk
Pulkowski, Narratives of Fragmentation International Law between Unity and Multiplicity, EUR.
SOC’Y INT’L L. 1 (2005) (presented at the ESIL Founding Conference in Florence), available at
http://www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/Pulkowski_0.PDF; Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th
Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/ L.682 (Apr. 13 2006).
The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation Towards a Common
U n d e r s t a n d in g A m o n g U N A g e n c ie s , U N I T E D N A T I O N S D E V . G R O U P ( 2 0 0 3 ),
http://www.undg.org/archive_docs/6959-The_Human_Rights_Based_Approach_to_Development_
Cooperation_Towards_a_Common_Understanding_among_UN.pdf.
An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanism, U. N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/items/3024.php (last visited Jan. 3,
2015).
Both branches are composed of 10 members, including one representative from each of the
five official UN regions (Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central and Eastern
Europe, and Western Europe and Others), one from the small island developing States, and
two each from Annex I and non-Annex I Parties. Id.
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greenhouse gas inventories, and the eligibility requirements under the
mechanism. It is simply the “watch dog” for non-compliance. Unlike the
Aarhus Convention, the Kyoto Protocol does not currently have any formal
compliance mechanism for private individuals and NGOs, whose interests or
rights are violated under the UNFCCC.23 Consequently, instead of establishing
a CRC, a slight institutional adjustment could be made by establishing a third
branch, the Public Complaints Branch, that can holistically address
compensation and rehabilitation claims such as this from all regions. This
arguably avoids the exorbitant costs in terms of structure and resources for
creating a single CRC for AOSIS states. It also builds on existing capacities and
resources.
Similarly, Professor Maxine's proposal places the fact-finding functions of the
CRC in the hands of Commissioners, who she notes, will be saddled with
investigating claims and complaints. An argument can also be made that the
fact-finding functions can be placed within the mandate of the current Expert
Review Teams (ERTs) of the UNFCCC, an international team of experts that
review emission reduction inventories, reports, and methodologies submitted to
Parties to ensure accuracy. Arguably, the mandate and constitution of ERTs
may be expanded to serve as the fact-finding and expert review team of the
UNFCCC, including for reviewing claims for compensation. Reformed ERTs
could be at the forefront of examining claims from AOSIS communities, thereby
keeping the entire UNFCCC structure more compact, coherent, and less
fragmented.
D. Accountability in the Claim Process
Professor Burkett's proposal that under the CRC framework, governments of
small island states will file consolidated claims on their citizens’ behalf before
the CRC raises complex accountability concerns. This is the question whether
national governments can be trusted to ensure transparency and accountability
with respect to collating and presenting climate change claims. Generally,
accountability has been described as the obligation to demonstrate that a project
has been conducted in accordance with agreed rules and standards and to report
fairly and accurately on performance results vis-à-vis mandated roles or plans.24
Here, we define accountability in terms of openness and fairness in the process
of accessing international compensation bodies for damages and reparations
23.
24.

See Charlotte Streck & Jolene Lin, Making Markets Work: A Review of CDM Performance and the
Need for Reform, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 409, 409-42 (2008).
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], PUBLIC SECTOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY: MAKING IT HAPPEN 7 (2002).
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resulting from climate-induced slow-onset events.25
It encompasses the
structural conditions, the processes, and the indicators and outcomes, through
which the CRC reviews and monitors the practical impacts of climate change on
the public. As such, an accountable organization would provide an adequate
structure to ensure a transparent review, measurement, and monitoring of the
process leading to the filing of claims before it. The UN General Assembly, for
instance, has adopted Resolution 60/260 on Accountability.26 This resolution
emphasized the importance of strengthened accountability within the United
Nations and the need for all UN agencies to ensure greater accountability
within their spheres of operation for the effective and efficient implementation
of legislative mandates and the best use of human and financial resources.
Many international treaties have increasingly taken the approach of
establishing individual complaint procedures that allow private citizens to bring
an action at an international forum for claims.
Other international
organizations have also established the Office of the Compliance Advisor or an
Ombudsperson to receive complaints and comments directly from the public.27
For example, the World Bank Inspection Panel (WBIP or the “Panel”) receives
direct claims from private individuals.
One critique of the current Kyoto Compliance Mechanism and the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) Executive Board (EB) example cited by
Burkett is that private individuals or members of the public do not have access
to request a review or submit a question of implementation under the current
Compliance Rules.28 The CDM EB is undergoing reforms to address a plenitude
of accountability and transparency concerns; for example, under the CDM, only
national authorities may request a project review—a situation that has resulted
in allegations that many national governments only present project review
requests that they consider compatible with national interests. This is quite
restrictive compared to Aarhus, under which a complaint before the Compliance
25.
26.
27.

28.
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See MICHAEL HAMMER ET AL., ONE WORLD TRUST, PATHWAYS TO ACCOUNTABILITY II: THE 2011
REVISED GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK (2011), available at http://oneworldtrust.org/
publications/doc_download/470-pathways-to-accountability-ii.
Investing in the United Nations: For a Stronger Organization Worldwide, G.A. Res. 60/260, at
art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/260 (May 8, 2006).
For example, the International Finance Corporation’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) is
an independent recourse mechanism for projects supported by the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the private sector
lending arms of the World Bank Group. The CAO was established in 1999 to address the concerns
of individuals or communities affected by IFC/MIGA–funded projects, to enhance the social and
environmental outcomes of IFC/MIGA projects, and to foster greater public accountability of IFC
and MIGA. See COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN, http://www.cao-ombudsman.org (last visited
Apr. 23, 2013).
Id.
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Review Mechanism can be triggered by one or more members of the public
concerning any Party’s compliance with the Convention.29 As of August 2013,
the Convention’s Compliance Committee has received over 40 communications
from the public—mostly from non-governmental organizations.
The accountability of a CRC could be measured in terms of its structural
conditions, processes, and outcomes.30 Structural conditions measure the
availability of relevant legal and institutional frameworks that make it possible
to attain the goals of the institution, in this case the CRC. It would include the
availability of rules and safeguards that prevent governmental secrecy and
unfairness, as well as the establishment of relevant institutions to monitor and
enforce such rules. At the international level, this speaks to the need to ensure
that reparations and claims are not influenced by governmental interests or
pressure. Process measures how established regimes and structures are
functioning in practice, whether they merely exist on paper or actually possess
the tools and capacity to ensure goal attainment. As such, it is not enough to
establish a CRC—its processes of admitting claims must be pragmatically
designed to ensure that it achieves its ultimate aims and goals. While
establishing such review structures, part of the task is to ensure their
accessibility and independence. Filing claims through intermediaries and
agents, such as governments and national authorities, would reduce
accessibility and independence. This aside, such review teams must be
equipped with the resources to perform spot assessments, fact findings, and
investigations, such that they could gather first-hand information on the true
impacts of climate change on the public. Despite debates on its perceived
weaknesses, the Panel provides a good example in this regard.31 WBIP adopts a

29.

30.

31.

[C]ommunications may be brought before the Committee by one or more members of
the public concerning any Party’s compliance with the Convention, unless that Party
has notified the Depositary in writing by the end of the applicable period that it is
unable to accept, for a period of not more than four years, the consideration of such
communications by the Committee.
Rep. of the 1st Mtg. of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Info., Public Participation in
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Envt’l Matters, ¶¶ 18-24, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.PP/2/
Add.8 (Apr. 2, 2004).
The UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health, Paul Hunt, has provided a framework,
which though not legally binding, could serve as a normative guide on how institutional
accountability can be measured. He argues that accountability should be measured in terms
of structural conditions, processes, and outcomes. U.N. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Interim Report
of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Right of Everyone to
Enjoy the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Mr Paul Hunt, ¶¶ 1429, U.N. Doc. A/58/427 (Oct. 10, 2003).
See Richard E. Bissell, Recent Practice of the Inspection Panel of the World Bank, 91 AM. J. INT’L
L. 741 (1997); David D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF, and Human Rights, 6 TRANSNAT’L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 47-90 (1996); Dana L. Clark, The Rise and Fall of Accountability, 6
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procedure that allows any community or group of individuals affected by a
project, including NGOs, to approach it for investigations. The process of
investigation is triggered by the submission of a request for inspection.
According to the WBIP Operating Procedures, two or more affected people may
submit a request. Similarly, a local organization or other duly appointed
representative on behalf of the affected people, a foreign organization in
exceptional circumstances if no local representative is available, or an executive
director of the World Bank may submit a review request. A request may be
submitted in any language and in any format, including by a mere letter, except
that it must be in writing, dated and signed by the requesters.32 The Panel also
respects the confidentiality of requesters who ask that their names not be
published. According to the Panel’s procedures, a request would be registered
for further processing unless the Chairperson determines that it is “without
doubt manifestly outside the Panel’s mandate.”33 The Panel also maintains a
publicly accessible register of registered requests that is available on its
website.34 The process established by the WBIP allows members of the public to
directly file review requests, thereby facilitating accessibility and independence.
Outcome, the last element, tests whether the structural conditions and
processes are actually bringing about results in providing compensation and
reparations for the victims of climate-induced stress. While the outcome may
tell us whether human rights are enforced, structural conditions and processes
tell us how they are enforced.
When viewed through the lens of structural conditions, processes, and
outcome, the current frame proposed by Burkett calls for a rethinking if
transparency and accountability are to be guaranteed in the process of seeking
compensation and rehabilitation before the CRC. There is a need to ensure the
accessibility and independence of the CRC by making it open to private
individuals and non-governmental organizations that have suffered direct
impacts of slow-onset events without having to go through national
governments.

32.

33.
34.
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WATERSHED no. 3, 52, 52-55 (2001); Richard E. Bissell, Institutional and Procedural Aspects of the
Inspection Panel, in THE INSPECTION PANEL OF THE WORLD BANK: A DIFFERENT COMPLAINTS
PROCEDURE 107 (Gudmundur Alfredsson & Rolf Ring eds., 2001).
Operating Procedure – English, THE INSPECTION PANEL, ¶¶ 6-15, http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:20175161~menuPK:64129254~
pagePK:64129751~piPK:64128378~theSitePK:380794,00.html#Subject (last visited Nov. 30,
2014).
Id. at ¶ 22.
See THE INSPECTION PANEL, http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited
Jan. 3, 2015).
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III. Conclusion
As Professor Burkett rightly reckons, the practical questions and hurdles that
a CRC may face along the way are enormous. This paper has identified and
discussed four more of these. The hurdles, however, do not call for intellectual
surrender. The proposals for a CRC represent an ingenious approach aimed at
tackling the impacts of slow-onset events in AOSIS states through a framework
that indemnifies, compensates, and rehabilitates the injured person for the loss
suffered. Through this framework, financial assistance will be provided for the
most vulnerable victims of slow-onset events to reclaim their futures. Every
framework will generally attract its own measure of pessimism and optimism.
As such, considering the strategic importance of this CRC framework to address
the question of how sustainable financial instruments may be designed to
appropriately address loss and damage associated with slow-onset events and
may be provided for AOSIS states, a forward-looking approach is needed to
continue to fine-tune the CRC framework to ensure practical questions and
paradoxes are significantly addressed.
There is also a need to continue to raise awareness at all levels about why
this proposal is important to the future of AOSIS states and to global actions on
climate change. If the process of international climate change negotiations is
anything to go by, one key way of ensuring international acceptance of a
proposal is through sustained awareness at the national level of the need for
action. Considering the nature of problems generated by slow-onset events,
particularly loss of lives, loss of subsistence, and the dislocation of people from
ancestral lands and homes, it is important to raise awareness on why reforms to
extant approval processes are not only important, but required. International
diplomacy has been largely influenced by the ability of NGOs and
environmental interest groups to raise awareness and to put pressure on
national governments to effect change or reform at the international level.35 As

35.

Although NGOs are formally only observers at a number of United Nations conferences,
including climate change conferences (without voting rights and with restricted access to the
corridors), plenary sessions, and some contact groups, nonetheless, many scholars agree that
NGOs still make a great difference in global environmental politics. NGOs and interest
groups have played active roles in putting pressure on international gatekeepers to support
environmental negotiation processes. One frequently cited example is how Environmental
NGOs (ENGOs) contributed to drafting the UNFCCC at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 by
participating in government delegations, lobbying, building public pressure, and contributing
to the content and structure of the negotiation text. The influence and role of NGOs in
international lawmaking therefore cannot be sidelined. NGOs such as Green Peace
International, Amnesty International, Down to Earth Group, Earth Right, and Earth Justice
can play extensive roles in creating international awareness of the need to address the human
rights’ impacts of climate change on small island and low-lying coastal countries. For
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Sterk rightly notes, international politics do not happen in a vacuum—the
positions countries take internationally are determined mainly by their
domestic political situations.36
As such, progress in reforming current
international climate negotiations to include compensations and rehabilitations
would be enhanced if pro-climate advocacy coalitions can be brought together in
key countries and across borders to demand change. The fear of possible
backlash from the press or environmental NGOs could elevate the need for
negotiators to push for reforms. With an intensive awareness driven by NGOs
and interest groups, particularly NGOs in developed countries, there could be
increased pressure on negotiators, policy makers, and international gatekeepers
to support amendments aimed at addressing the impacts of climate change in
AOSIS states. Such awareness drives have enormous potential to culminate in
the eventual reform and amendment of key provisions of the UNFCCC to
recognize the unique vulnerabilities of AOSIS states. They might also succeed

36.
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example, Green Peace International and Down to Earth Group have already launched a series
of projects that highlight these concerns. If stakeholders or government in an AOSIS
country—say, Cape Verde—can develop a detailed amendment proposal based on some of the
ideas discussed in this paper and seek support from these NGOs on the importance of
compensating and rehabilitating victims of climate change in small island and low-lying
coastal countries, a coordinated awareness drive would be generated that could result in
widespread call for countries to support the establishment of a compensation and
rehabilitation mechanism as part of the global regime on climate. See generally BAS ARTS,
THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF GLOBAL NGOS: CASE STUDIES ON THE CLIMATE AND
BIODIVERSITY CONVENTIONS (Annemarie Weitsel ed., 1998); SEBASTIAN OBERTHUR ET AL.,
PARTICIPATION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE: LEGAL BASIS AND PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE (2002); Steinar Andresen & Lars H.
Gulbrandsen, The Role of Green NGOs in Promoting Climate Compliance, in IMPLEMENTING
THE CLIMATE REGIME: INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE 169, 169 (Jon Hovi, Olav Stokke & Geir
Ulfstein eds., 2005); Michele Betsill, Environmental NGOs and the Kyoto Protocol
Negotiations: 1995 to 1997, in NGO DIPLOMACY: THE INFLUENCE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS 43, 43-66 (Michele Betsill
& Elisabeth Corell eds., 2008); Michele Betsill & Elisabeth Corell, A Comparative Look at
NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: Desertification and Climate
Change, 1 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 86 (2001); Michele Betsill & Elisabeth Corell, NGO Influence
in International Environmental Negotiations: A Framework for Analysis, 1 GLOBAL ENVTL
POL. 65 (2001); Chad Carpenter, Businesses, Green Groups and the Media: The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Climate Change Debate, 77 INTL. AFF. 313, 313-28 (2001);
Kal Raustiala, Nonstate Actors in the Global Climate Regime, in INT’L REL. & GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 95 (Urs Luterbacher & Detlef Sprinz eds., 2001); Katharina Rietig,
Public Pressure versus Lobbying – How do Environmental NGOs Matter Most in Climate
Negotiations? (Ctr. for Climate Change Economics and Policy, Working Paper No. 79, 2011).
See Wolfgang Sterk, House Cleaning in Doha: UN Climate Summit Delivers Second Life for Kyoto
but no Deal to Revive Carbon Market, 1 CARBON MECHANISMS REV. 7 (Jan.–Mar. 2013). The
author argues that international negotiations can rarely make decisions that have not been
previously prepared nationally, and that in the current situation, most key countries have no
appetite to undergo fundamental economic and ecologic transformations under current climate
change regimes. Id.
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in creating more information and re-wakening on the need for more funding
support for AOSIS states.
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